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Abstract 
Existing research shows that house prices respond to local school quality as measured by average test 
scores. However, higher test scores could signal higher academic value-added or higher ability, more 
sought-after intakes. In our research, we show that both school value-added and student prior 
achievement – linked to the background of children in schools – affect households’ demand for 
education. In order to identify these effects, we improve the boundary discontinuity regression 
methodology by matching identical properties across admissions authority boundaries; by allowing for 
boundary effects and spatial trends; by re-weighting our data towards transactions that are closest to 
district boundaries; by eliminating boundaries that coincide with major geographical features; and by 
submitting our estimates to a number of novel falsification tests. Our results survive this battery of 
tests and show that a one-standard deviation change in either school average value-added or prior 
achievement raises prices by around 3%. 
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1. Introduction 
Good schooling is frequently upheld as decisive in life, but empirical evidence remains quite 
ambiguous when it comes to pinning down what makes a ‘good’ school and what people value in 
education. Parents making school choices seem well aware of their preferences and go to great 
lengths to secure places for their children at their preferred schools. However, social scientists have 
had mixed success in eliciting general conclusions about the nature of these preferences.  
Researchers in education have regularly used survey responses to learn about preferences for 
schools (e.g. Coldron and Boulton, 1991; Flatley et al., 2001; and Schneider and Buckley, 2002). 
The evidence from this field shows that parents rank academic outcomes highly among the reasons 
for choosing a school, but other factors play an important role, such as distance from home, school 
composition, safety and wellbeing. More recently, parents’ actual choices of schools and teachers 
have been used as an alternative way to uncover preferences for school attributes (e.g. Hastings et 
al., 2005; and Jacob and Lefgren, 2007). 
Apart from these examples, other research has looked for evidence of the value of schools in 
the capitalisation of their benefits into housing prices – i.e. using the hedonic valuation method. 
This wide-ranging international literature has shown that the demand for school quality is at least 
partly revealed in housing prices whenever school places are assigned to neighbouring homes. 
Gibbons and Machin (2008), Black and Machin (2010), Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011) and 
Machin (2011) provide summaries of recent evidence, all suggesting a consensus estimate of around 
3-4% house price premium for one standard deviation increase in school average test scores.  
One limitation of previous work is that – with a few exceptions – it is confined to showing that 
prices follow headline school performance as measured by school average test scores. However, 
better test scores could occur through improvements in enrolment quality or through greater pupil 
progress – potentially driven by teaching quality, school resources, peer effects and school 
effectiveness. One possibility is that parents pay for school ‘value-added’ that represents the 
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expected academic gains for their children. A second possibility is that parents pay for good peers 
and favourable school composition – i.e. school inputs – irrespective of the contribution of these 
factors to their own child's achievements.
1
 While the first perspective is interesting from a policy 
point of view because it puts a price on interventions that raise academic standards, the second one 
is relevant because of its implications for school segregation (e.g. Epple and Romano, 2000). 
A handful of papers have taken steps to disentangle these two channels of influence. 
Brasington and Haurin’s (2006) results show that that school value-added and initial achievements 
both have positive effects on prices, although this point is somewhat lost in their conclusions. Kane 
et al. (2005) also consider value-added and average test scores as alternative indicators of school 
performance. However, they do not present specifications that include both indicators and do not 
aim to provide evidence on the importance of value-added. In contrast, Clapp et al. (2007) show 
that pupil ethnicity seems more important than test scores to home buyers around Connecticut 
schools, although the authors do not have access to data on pupils’ academic progress.  
Other papers have looked at the importance of school expenditure relative to test score outputs. 
For example, Downes and Zabel (2002) find that test scores are capitalised into local house prices, 
whereas measures of school expenditures are not. Cellini et al. (2010) use referenda outcomes in 
California’s school finance system to suggest that house prices respond to the level of capital 
expenditure per pupil and that this cannot be fully explained by changes in test scores. Occasionally 
other school attributes have been considered. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) find that state-
assigned school ratings have a transient effect on prices, over and above test scores, suggesting that 
householders draw additional information about achievement from these grades, or else value the 
ratings in their own right. Finally, Gibbons and Machin (2006) suggest that popularity in itself 
                                                 
1
 Kramarz et al. (2009) provide empirical tests of the relative importance of pupil, school and peer effects in 
determining test scores. Their findings suggest that a large part of the variation in test scores is explained by pupil 
attributes, followed by school quality differentials, while peers’ characteristics matter less. This is consistent with 
Gibbons and Telhaj (2008), Lavy et al. (2012) and most other studies of peer effects. 
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raises prices, given that over-capacity schools command an additional premium relative to under-
capacity schools with equal performance. 
Our paper moves this literature forward in a number of important ways. Our first contribution 
is to use a convincing strategy to show that house prices respond causally to school age-7 to age-11 
test score gains (value-added), indicating that parents value school educational output. Our results 
suggest that parents also value the average age-7 test score component of this value-added measure, 
which we interpret as a marker for students’ background characteristics. We argue that this result 
arises from parental demand for good school composition, rather than demand for school quality in 
the early years, even if school composition is not a productive input in the educational production 
function. This interpretation is supported by further evidence showing that the price effects from 
age-7 achievements are completely explained by students’ background characteristics, especially 
their eligibility for free meals (a proxy for low family income). 
Our second contribution is to further refine, improve and test the boundary discontinuity 
regression method, which is the ‘state-of-the-art’ approach used in this field to mitigate potential 
biases induced by neighbourhood unobservables. We present several innovations and refinements, 
which can be summarised as follows: (a) We combine matching methods with the regression-
discontinuity design to allow for flexibility in the way in which housing observables affect price 
differentials across boundaries; (b) We incorporate in our models a variety of boundary fixed effects 
and spatial trends to account semi-parametrically for between-district unobserved heterogeneity and 
trends in amenities across boundaries; (c) We inverse-distance weight our regressions such that 
identification comes from variation at the admission zone boundaries where neighbourhood 
heterogeneity is minimised; this refines previous studies which used samples restricted to fixed 
buffer-zones close to boundaries (e.g. 1/4 mile); (e) We perform a number of falsification exercises 
and a compelling placebo test which uses the quality of autonomous state schools that do not admit 
on the basis of residential location, but administer the same standard tests as the mainstream schools 
that prioritise admission on place of residence. 
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A final advantage of our work is that we establish these findings using large scale 
administrative data for the whole of England, and not just for one city (e.g. Boston or San 
Francisco) as done by much of the previous research. The size and coverage of our data makes the 
above strategies feasible and the findings more representative.  
To preview our results, we find that a one-standard deviation change in either age-7 to age-11 
school average value-added or prior (age 7) achievement raises prices by around 3% for schools 
that prioritise students who live close by. Conversely, we show that there is no house price premium 
attached to properties close to high quality schools that do not prioritise local students. This finding 
– alongside other falsification exercises – demonstrates that our findings are causal and not 
spurious.
2
 Finally, various back-of-the envelope calculations show that the magnitude of this house 
price response to school quality is plausible as a parental investment decision given the expected 
return in terms of future earnings of their children. 
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 explains our methods. 
Section 3 discusses the context in which we apply our approach and the data setup. Section 4 
presents our results and discussion. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.  
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1. Methodological framework 
Our empirical work uses a geographical boundary-based regression discontinuity design. This 
approach was initially popularised by the work of Black (1999), with several more recent examples 
(e.g. Bogart and Cromwell, 2000; Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006; Bayer and McMillan, 2005; 
Kane et al., 2005; Davidoff and Leigh, 2007; Fack and Grenet, 2010; Bayer et al., 2007, and Ries 
and Somerville, 2010). Closely related studies investigate the effects of local taxes (Cushing, 1984, 
                                                 
2
 Note that this is different from the exercise of Fack and Grenet (2010), who show that house prices respond less to the 
quality of local non-autonomous schools if there are autonomous schools in the area. The authors cannot perform a 
similar falsification test because their autonomous schools are private schools and are not ranked using comparable 
performance tables as state schools (unlike ours) . 
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Duranton et al., 2006; Holmes, 1998) and market access when there are changes in national borders 
and their permeability (Redding and Sturm, 2008; Hanson, 2003). 
The standard hedonic property value model (Sheppard, 1999) represents property market prices 
(usually log prices) as a linear combination of observable property attributes and the implicit market 
price of these attributes. The implicit prices can be estimated by standard least squares regression 
techniques, but researchers usually do not observe all salient property and neighbourhood 
characteristics, leading to omitted variable biases. This problem is particularly acute for amenities – 
e.g. school performance – that depend on the distribution of characteristics in the local population, 
and hence on sorting in relation to unobserved area effects.  
A way to mitigate this problem is to difference the data between close-neighbouring houses to 
eliminate area-specific unobservables, but this strategy only works for school quality if there is a 
sharp discontinuity in its supply between close-neighbouring homes. This condition holds when 
admissions involve contiguous pre-defined admission zones such that residents on each side of the 
boundary have access to different sets of schools. Regression specifications can then include 
attendance district boundary dummy variables, or be estimated on data that is differenced between 
matched pairs of neighbouring houses on either side of the boundary. This research design is set out 
below in a way that will help explain our methods. 
The price p  (in logs) of a house sale, with characteristics  x c  in a location c , is: 
     p s c x c g c       (1) 
where  s c  represents the expected school ‘quality’ that residents can access at residence at c . 
‘Quality’ includes both school composition and effectiveness, and in our empirical application we 
estimate the effects of these different components separately. As usual,   represents unobserved 
housing attributes and errors that are assumed to be independent of x  and c . The function  g c  
represents unobserved influences on market prices that are correlated across neighbouring locations, 
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such that the price varies deterministically with geographical position. Location c  can be specified 
in various ways, most flexibly in terms of a vector of geographical or Cartesian coordinates. 
2.2. Identification issues in geographical boundary discontinuity models 
The fundamental identification problem arises because of the common dependence of prices, 
housing characteristics and anticipated school quality on  g c , which can be potentially eliminated 
by spatial differencing between locations i  and j : 
                 i j i j i i j j i j i jp p s c s c x c x c g c g c             (2) 
and choosing i  and j to be as geographically close as is feasibly possible. Consistent estimation of 
the implicit prices ( ,  ) requires the unobservable spatial component    i jg c g c  to be 
effectively random, and (conditional on x) uncorrelated with the difference in school quality 
   i js c s c . This condition will not hold in general, and will require the researcher to find 
locations ,i j  such that locally        , 0i j i jCov s c s c g c g c      and     0i jVar s c s c     
(conditional on observed housing and neighbourhood characteristics). These two conditions are 
unlikely to be met for any continuous functions    . , .s g  because the first requires that i jc c , 
which would violate the second. However, the two conditions can hold approximately for closely 
spaced neighbours if  .s  is discontinuous and  .g is continuous such that: 
A1:     0i jVar g c g c     
as 0i jc c  , where i jc c  is the Euclidian distance 
between house sales i  and j . 
A2:     i jVar s c s c      
as 0i jc c  , where   is a positive constant (or positive 
definite matrix if s is multidimensional). 
The geographical boundary discontinuity approach exploits A1 by choosing ,i j  to be as close 
together as possible, whilst ensuring that ,i j  are on different sides of an attendance zone boundary 
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to satisfy A2. Note that the geographical boundary discontinuity method differs from the standard 
regression discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) in which a single forcing variable (e.g. 
voting share, as in Lee et al., 2004) determines treatment (e.g. party affiliation of an elected 
representative), although the general principle is similar. 
In practical empirical settings, there are three main threats to the identification strategy 
sketched above: 
(a)  There are spatial trends in amenities across boundaries, implying that even if assumption A1 
holds in principle, it is violated in practice because the distance between sales 
i jc c  in 
housing sales samples is never exactly zero. Such cases occur when spatially correlated 
amenities cause house prices on one side of a boundary to differ on average from those on the 
other side (highly localised factors contained in i j   
are not a concern). Examples of these 
include a rail station or a good secondary school driving up prices in one direction moving 
away from a primary school admissions boundary (we will return to this issue in Section 3.2), 
pulling richer families and better school intakes into the high price side. 
(b)  There are boundary discontinuities in prices not caused by school quality differences, but 
driven by a discontinuity in  g c , violating assumption A1. A typical case occurs when 
attendance zone boundaries coincide with geographical features (roads, railways etc.) that 
partition communities. Other cases can arise without visible evidence of the boundary on the 
ground, if houses on different sides have different directional aspect or outlook (e.g. one south 
facing, the other north facing), or because districts have different tax rates or district-specific 
local services, like refuse collection or policing. 
(c)  School quality is not discontinuous at the boundary, violating assumption A2. This could occur 
if attendance boundaries are porous allowing pupils to attend schools in neighbouring districts 
because of historical changes to school admissions policies or attendance zones not being 
enforced. Note however, that the discontinuity can be ‘fuzzy’ and identification requires only 
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that there is a change in the probability of attending different sets of schools, and hence 
expected school quality, as one crosses the boundary. 
2.3. Methods to address the identification problems 
Although the concerns discussed above have been partly addressed in the literature, our analysis 
goes much further in establishing the credibility of the boundary discontinuity approach through a 
series of robustness and falsification tests. Some of these checks are refinements of methods that 
have been previously applied, while others are completely novel. For clarity, these strategies are 
labelled M1-M7 and this coding is used in the results section.  
M1. Difference between matched property transactions with identical observable characteristics 
across administrative boundaries. Following the literature on non-parametric discrete-cell 
matching (Rubin, 1973), we pair up each house sale with the nearest transaction of the same 
property type on the opposite side of an administrative attendance district in the same year 
(Fack and Grenet, 2010, use a similar idea but match to fictitious predicted sales prices). 
M2. Weight regressions to zero-distance housing transaction pairs and include distance to 
boundary polynomials to control for cross-boundary price trends of the type (a) discussed 
above. Earlier work (e.g. Black, 1999) tested robustness to cross-boundary trends by restricting 
the analysis to narrow distance buffers along the boundary, i.e. applying weights of 1 to 
transactions within the buffer and zero otherwise. We generalise this by weighting observations 
in inverse proportion to the distance between sales, such that greater weight applies to 
observations that are close neighbours (on opposite sides of the boundary). This is an important 
contribution of our approach given that conditions A1 and A2 hold as the distance between 
paired transactions approaches zero. Following the regression discontinuity literature, we also 
control for polynomial trends in distance from the boundary discontinuity (e.g. DiNardo and 
Lee, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; and Clark, 2009).  
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M3. Include boundary fixed effects in cross-boundary difference models to control for boundary-
specific discontinuities of the type (b) discussed above. Our institutional context features 
multiple schools on each side of an attendance district boundary, so that school quality varies 
across boundaries and along a boundary within a given attendance district. This data structure 
allows for boundary fixed effects in our cross-boundary differenced model, thus eliminating 
between-boundary variation due to unobservable factors fixed along to the boundary. This is 
crucial given assumption A1 and the problems with boundary-specific discontinuities 
highlighted in Section 2.2 under case (b).
3
 
M4. Restrict our attention to boundaries where pupils rarely cross to address fuzzy discontinuities 
of the type (c) discussed above. Our data allows us to observe whether pupils cross an 
admission district boundary to attend their school, so we can check the sensitivity of our results 
to the fuzziness of the school quality discontinuity arising from pupil flows across boundaries. 
M5. Eliminate boundaries that coincide with significant geographical obstacles. Our analysis uses 
only inland school district boundaries that do not coincide with tidal estuaries and rivers (e.g. 
the Thames in London). In addition, we eliminate portions of the boundaries that coincide with 
major roads, motorways and railways, to test sensitivity to non-schooling related sources of 
price discontinuity as in point (b) above.  
M6. Compare results for cases in which home location is and is not a school admission criterion. 
Our institutional context has two types of schools. For the majority (65%) non-autonomous 
institutions, school places are typically allocated first to pupils who live closest to the school 
and attendance district boundaries are binding. There are therefore compelling reasons to buy a 
home close to a school of choice and on the ‘good’ side of the boundary. On the other hand, 
autonomous schools (mainly religious, comprising about 35% of schools) operate pupil 
admissions policies that do not compel families to buy their home close to the school (e.g. 
                                                 
3
 This approach is different from Dhar and Ross (2012) who exploit time variation to include boundary effects. 
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based on church attendance and denomination). Although parents might still buy a house close 
to the school of choice to minimise travel costs, they do not need to do so to secure admission 
to their children. Thus, we expect local house prices to respond to the quality of non-
autonomous schools, but not to the quality of autonomous schools. This institutional feature 
provides us with a novel and demanding falsification test based on the comparison of the price 
response to the quality of both types of schools as an additional check on the issues raised in 
points (a) and (b) in Section 2.2. We discuss these features of the school admission system in 
more detail in Section 3.2. 
M7. Apply falsification tests using fake attendance boundaries. We re-estimate our models using 
differences between transactions in our boundary sample that are separated by similar distances 
to the transactions matched across boundaries, but actually lie within the same attendance 
district. This method was first applied in Black (1999) for Boston, MA. However, we go 
further and provide a powerful falsification test using differences between property 
transactions along a network of imaginary attendance boundaries that mimics real patterns, but 
is geographically translated in a south-westerly direction. A finding of a positive association 
between school quality and housing prices in this case would falsify the claim that price effects 
are causally linked to cross-boundary school quality discontinuities. This exercise addresses 
the concerns raised in point (a) in Section 2.2 and tests assumption A1.  
The robustness and falsification tests described above relate to identification of the causal 
effect of school quality and other characteristics on house prices. However, there is an additional set 
of identification issues that arise when households’ preferences and/or incomes are heterogeneous 
and the aim is to interpret regression estimates as measures of the ‘willingness to pay’ for school 
quality. With sorting of households in response to school quality, a hedonic regression does not 
necessarily estimate the mean valuation of school quality, because willingness to pay varies with 
household characteristics. Bayer et al. (2007) (building on methods introduced by Berry et al., 
1995) provide a structural solution to this problem, but their method relies on strong and hard-to-
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test assumptions. We do not wish to impose this much structure and present no novel solution to 
this problem. Therefore, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences and sorting across 
boundaries, our discontinuity design will provide a weighted average of the marginal WTP of 
residents along the admissions zone boundary. In our defence, the work by Bayer et al. (2007) 
shows that traditional hedonic regressions are effective at evaluating mean WTP in contexts (like 
ours) where the amenity in question is supplied at various qualities in many different locations.
4
 
A second consequence of sorting is that it becomes difficult to separate willingness to pay for 
school quality from willingness to pay for neighbours’ quality. Part of the association between 
school quality and house prices necessarily works through its effect on neighbours’ quality. Our 
robustness checks in this respect are limited to a control variable strategy in which many of the 
neighbourhood demographic controls are potentially endogenous. Nevertheless, our evidence shows 
that our estimates of the value of school quality are steadfastly linked directly to school attributes, 
not to neighbourhood quality. In addition, we graphically and statistically test for the presence of 
discontinuities in salient area characteristics following the regression discontinuity design literature 
(and similar to Bayer et al., 2007, and Kane et al., 2005), and find none. 
3. Institutional Context, Data and Empirical Specification 
3.1. National curriculum and assessment in England 
Compulsory education in England is organised into five stages referred to as Key Stages. In the 
primary phase, pupils enter school at age 4-5 in the Foundation Stage then move on to Key Stage 1 
(ks1), spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7. At age 7-8 pupils move to Key Stage 2, sometimes – but not 
usually – with a change of school.5 At the end of Key Stage 2 (ks2), when they are 10-11, children 
leave the primary phase and go on to secondary school where they progress through Key Stage 3 
                                                 
4
 The authors find a house price response of approximately 2.5% for a one standard deviation change in test scores in 
their ‘standard’ hedonic models, which rises to around 3% when accounting for the effects of sorting.  
5
 In some cases there are separate Infants and Junior schools (covering Key Stage 1 and 2 respectively) and a few LAs 
operate a Middle School system (bridging the primary and secondary phases) – we do not consider these schools here. 
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and 4. At the end of each Key Stage, in May, pupils are assessed on the basis of standard national 
tests, and progress through the phases is measured in terms of Key Stage Levels, ranging between 
W (working towards Level 1) and Level 5+ in the primary phase. A point system can also be 
applied to convert these levels into scores that represent about one term’s (10-12 weeks) progress. 
Since 1996, in the autumn of each year, the results of the National Curriculum assessment at 
Key Stage 2 are published as a guide to primary school performance. More recently, since 2003, a 
value-added score has also been reported, based on the average pupil gain at each school between 
age 7 and age 11 (relative to the national average). Schools and Local Education Authorities report 
these performance figures in their admissions documents, and parents refer to these documents and 
the performance tables, as well as using word-of-mouth recommendations, when choosing schools 
(see, inter alia, Flatley et al., 2001 and Gibbons and Silva, 2011b). 
In our empirical work below, we use the ks1 to ks2 test score value-added (va) as the main 
indicator of schools’ production output, or effectiveness, while ks1 scores serve as a control for 
pupils’ prior academic achievements. These ks1 scores provide a summary indicator of school 
inputs embodied in the pupil intake, which parents can infer from the published ks2 scores, school 
visits, word of mouth, and other local knowledge.
6
 These ks1 tests could reflect the effectiveness of 
a school in a child’s early years, but they are not made public and so cannot provide parents with a 
direct signal of school performance. In Section 4.6 we directly test and discuss the significance of 
other pupil background characteristics as proxies for school intake quality. 
3.2. School types, admissions and boundaries 
All state primary schools in England are funded largely by the central government, through Local 
Authorities (LAs, formerly Local Education Authorities) that are responsible for schools in their 
                                                 
6
 Performance tables contain information on the fraction of students with special education needs (SEN), with varying 
degrees of severity. SEN status is partly based on poor performance in early tests and assessments. Thus parents can 
gather some indirect information about the intake quality of a school using performance tables. More recently the tables 
provide much more contextual data on student background, but this information postdates the periods in our study. 
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geographical domain. These schools fall into a number of different categories and differ in terms of 
their governance and who controls pupil admissions.
7
 Two thirds of primary schools are termed 
‘Community’ schools and are closely controlled by the LA. The remaining third are usually linked 
to a Faith or charitable organisation and are more autonomously run. The key difference relevant to 
this paper is between schools that make their own choices on whom to admit – which we term 
autonomous schools – and non-autonomous schools such as Community schools to which pupils are 
assigned by the Local Authority. Gibbons et al. (2008) and Gibbons and Silva (2011a) provide more 
details on the overall differences between these two groups of schools. 
All LAs and schools must organise their admissions arrangements in accordance with the 
current (now statutory) School Admissions Code. The guiding principle is that parental choice 
should be the first consideration when ranking applications to a primary school. However, if the 
number of applicants exceeds the number of available places, almost any criterion, which is not 
discriminatory, does not involve selection by ability and can be clearly assessed by parents, can be 
used to prioritise applicants. These criteria vary in detail and change over time, but preference in 
non-autonomous schools is usually given first to children with special educational needs, next to 
children with siblings in the school and, crucially, to those children who live closest. For Faith and 
other autonomous schools, regular attendance at church and other expressions of religious 
commitment are foremost priorities. Place of residence almost never features among admission 
guidelines for Faith schools, and when it does it relates to Diocese boundaries, which do not follow 
non-autonomous school admission boundaries. Consequently, there is little reason for parents to 
pay for homes close to good autonomous schools, other than to reduce travel costs.  
Another crucial feature of the admission system that applies to non-autonomous, but not to 
autonomous primary schools, is that pupils hardly ever attended non-autonomous primary schools 
                                                 
7
 LAs are responsible for the strategic management of state education services, including planning the supply of school 
places, intervening where a school is failing and allocating central funding to schools. Additionally, there is a small 
private, fee-paying sector, educating around 6-7% of pupils in England, which we do not consider here. 
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outside of their LA of residence during the years under analysis. This is because, although families 
are allowed to apply to non-autonomous schools in other LAs, up until recently parents had to make 
separate applications to different LAs. More importantly, LAs did not have a statutory requirement 
to find a school for pupils from other school districts.
8
 As a result, banking on admission to a 
popular non-autonomous primary school in another LA is a high-risk strategy, and LA boundaries 
effectively act as primary school admissions district boundaries over the period we study. This 
provides a source of discontinuity in the non-autonomous primary school ‘quality’ that residents 
can access on different sides of LA boundaries. 
Note also that LA barriers are not binding for secondary school admissions (age 12 onwards), 
which are fewer in number (approximately 2500, compared to around 14000 primary schools), 
attract students over greater distance (nearly three times the median distance for primary schools) 
and, crucially, from different LAs.  
3.3. Source data 
Three main data sources are used. The Price-paid dataset from the UK Land Registry for the years 
2000-2006 provides administrative data on address, sales price and basic characteristics of all 
domestic properties sold in the UK. Each property is located by its postcode – typically 17 
neighbouring addresses – and each postcode is assigned to a 1-metre geographical coordinate. 
Data on each pupil’s assessment record for all Key Stages plus information on school attended, 
gender, age, ethnicity, language skills, special educational needs, entitlement to free meals, 
residential postcode are obtained from the National Pupil Database (NPD). This is an administrative 
pupil-level dataset collected by the UK’s Department for Education (DfE). Additional information 
on schools is gathered from the “Edubase” database, the Annual School Census and the Consistent 
                                                 
8
 More precisely, the Education Act 1996 section 14 reads: “(1) A Local Education Authority shall secure that sufficient 
schools for providing (a) Primary education, and (b) education that is Secondary education (…) for their area. (2) The 
schools available for an area shall not be regarded as sufficient (…) unless they are sufficient in number, character and 
equipment to provide for all pupils the opportunity of appropriate education”. 
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Financial Reporting series that can also be obtained from the DfE. Neighbourhood characteristics at 
Output Area (OA) level come from the 2001 GB Census, and are linked to the housing transactions 
data by postcode.
9
  
3.4. Linking schools to housing transactions and matching across boundaries 
Linking the school data to housing sales is complex, because the admissions system implies that 
there is no one-to-one mapping between a postcode and the set of schools accessible from that 
location within the LA of residence. We infer this mapping using a computationally intensive, but 
intuitive approach. This procedure imputes the set of schools accessible from each postcode in our 
Price-paid housing transactions database using the actual attendance patterns of pupils that are 
recorded in the NPD. This is much more sophisticated than just assigning a house to a set of nearest 
schools, and is essential when we want to exploit discontinuities generated by LA boundaries. 
Moreover, this ‘revealed preference’ definition of catchment areas implicitly accounts for features 
of school choice and attendance patterns that would be obscured by simpler assignment rules. The 
exact mapping procedure, its justification and the practical implementation are described in detail in 
Appendix A. 
After creating each school-specific catchment area, we calculate the distance and direction 
from each school to each housing transaction postcode (up to a maximum distance of 10km – the 
99.5
th
 percentile of home-school distance at age 7) and assign each postcode to multiple schools by 
deducing which housing transactions lie within which school catchment areas. Postcode-specific 
school characteristics are then obtained by averaging the characteristics of the schools to which the 
postcode is assigned and applying higher weights to the nearest schools (unweighted means give 
similar results).  
The procedure described above yields a dataset of over 1.6 million transactions for 2003, 2004, 
2005 and 2006 joined to data on the average characteristics of the schools that are accessible from 
                                                 
9
 OAs in England contain on average 130 households and less than ten postcodes. 
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the postcode of each sale. To set up the spatially-differenced cross-boundary model in Equation (2) 
property transactions are matched to the nearest transaction in the same year of the same property 
type (detached, semi-detached, terraced or flats, and leasehold or freehold) occurring in an adjacent 
LA (method M1).
10
 For method M5, we further cut out boundaries that coincide with major roads, 
motorways and railways, while for method M7 we set up a set of matched sales across fake LA 
boundaries and a set of matched sales within LAs. For the within-LA matching, we pair houses in 
the boundary sub-sample imposing the constraint that the matched sale is within the same LA and at 
least 20m away (to achieve better comparability with the cross-LA samples).To generate the fake 
boundary matching, we simply translate the geographical coordinates of the housing transactions 
data by 10km North and 10km East, and repeat the matching exercise. 
3.5. Empirical specification 
Applying the data described above to Equation (2) yields the following empirical specification: 
 1 2 1hi i i i hi i hip va ks z x g c               (3) 
where hip  is the (log) price of the house sale h  in postcode i . The notation   means a difference 
between matched, closest transactions on either side of an LA boundary. The variable iva  
is the 
expected value-added and 1iks  
is the mean age-7 test score (our marker for background and prior 
achievement) for schools that can be accessed from location i . The vector iz  
contains other 
observable school and neighbourhood characteristics; the vector hx  
contains observable attributes 
of house sale h ; and the function  ig c  is parameterised using boundary dummy variables, 
distance to school, distance between matched transactions and various distance-to-boundary 
polynomials as set out in M2 and M3. Finally, i  represents the usual error term.  
                                                 
10
 Matching is restricted initially to properties with 2.5km, and then to within the median inter-property distance along 
the boundary so that the maximum distance varies with the density of transactions. 
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Although we have house sales and school attributes in multiple periods, we have suppressed 
the t-subscripts in Equation (3) for simplicity. The pupil census occurs in January, while pupils take 
their ks1 and ks2 assessments in May and the results are published towards the end of the calendar 
year. We therefore link prices of houses sold in calendar year t (January to December) to the age-7 
to age-11 valued-added and school census figures published at the end of year t-1 (October to 
November). Hence, ks1 results relate to the period t-5, although we present additional results that 
include ks1 measured just prior to the transaction date at time (t-1). Note that we do not exploit the 
time dimension alone in our identification strategy by differencing over time because test scores 
assigned to house postcodes are highly serially correlated and short-run changes are likely to be 
uninformative about school quality (Kane and Staiger 2002). Thus, in the next section we present 
results from regression estimates of the models in Equation (3) obtained by pooling all periods. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents some key descriptive statistics. The first two columns summarise the full data set, 
while the second two summarise the boundary sub-sample lying within 2500m of an LA border 
(described above). The average price of sales in the full data is £182,730. In the boundary sub-
sample the mean is about £13,000 or 7% higher. This is because administrative boundaries are more 
prevalent in and around towns and cities and there is a greater chance of finding matched pairs of 
sales in densely populated areas along boundaries in urban areas. Figure 1 illustrates the general 
spread of sales throughout England following the administrative boundary structure by showing the 
locations of transactions in the boundary sub-sample for two arbitrarily chosen geographical areas: 
the Midlands, North West and South Yorkshire (Panel A); and London and the South East (Panel 
B). 
In terms of school test scores, value-added is higher in the boundary sub-sample and ks1scores 
lower, but the differences are small. Houses in this sub-sample have slightly fewer accessible 
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schools and are closer to schools. This is consistent with our claim that LA boundaries restrict the 
choice set for houses located close to the boundary (see the discussion above and in Gibbons et al., 
2008), and with the urban nature of the sub-sample. For the boundary group, we also present 
statistics on the distance to the closest boundary and the distance between property pairs that are 
matched across boundaries. The raw mean distance to the boundary and nearest matched property is 
around 500 metres and 735 metres respectively. In the regressions, we apply inverse inter-sale 
distance weights, so the inverse distance weighted (IDW) means provide a better representation of 
the effective distances. These weighted distances are only 133m to the boundary and 206m to the 
nearest matched property. 
4.2. Evaluating the boundary discontinuities 
To support our argument that the LA district boundary creates a barrier to school admissions, we 
show that cross-district school attendance is much less prevalent than within-district attendance 
close to district boundaries. The relevant figures are presented in Table 2 and refer to proportions of 
students in the postcode. In the full dataset, only 3.3% of pupils attend schools other than in their 
home LAs, which largely reflects the fact that schools in neighbouring LAs will be further away. In 
the boundary sub-sample the proportion rises to 6.2%, while the IDW mean proportion crossing 
from each residential postcode in our sales data is 25%. Since this figure corresponds to addresses 
only 133m from the boundary (Table 1), we would expect a nearly 50% chance of attending a 
school on either side of the boundary if this did not impose a barrier and was unimportant for 
admission. Moreover, these means are from distributions that are highly right-skewed: the median 
proportion of pupils attending a school in a different district is zero.  
Explicit tests for discontinuities in school quality and other area characteristics at the LA 
boundary are provided in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In all these plots, the x-axis reports the distance to 
the LA boundary. The right hand side of the diagram (distance > 0) corresponds to sales which have 
access to greater school value-added than their match across the boundary, i.e.     0i js c s c   in 
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Equation (2). The left side of the diagram (distance < 0) corresponds to postcodes with access to 
value-added below that on the other side of the boundary. The figures are obtained as predictions 
from a regression of the cross-boundary difference in the relevant variable on a positive side and 
negative side constant term, and distance-decile dummies (up to 800m) from the boundary on each 
side. The dependent variables are standardised by the standard deviation of the cross-boundary 
difference (within 800m). The dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors 
clustered on the matched postcode jc . The plots are restricted to 500m on each side for clarity and 
shown alongside a test for whether the differences on both sides at the boundary are equal (i.e. an F-
test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ side dummies are equal). 
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows a large discontinuity in value-added scores at LA 
boundaries for non-autonomous schools (Assumption A2). This large difference occurs by 
construction given the way the right and left halves of the plot are defined. More importantly, 
almost half of the 2-standard deviation spread occurs within the first 100m, from where our 
identification will predominantly come. The top right panel shows that a discontinuity in house sale 
prices exists too: although visually small, the difference across the boundary is highly significant. 
Comparing the top left and right panels suggests that a 0.8 standard deviation change in school 
average value-added is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation change in house prices at the 
boundary. Note that prices do not follow school average value-added as the distance to the 
boundary increases because other amenities drive these spatial price trends. This illustrates the 
importance of weighting our regression estimates to close-neighbour observations and controlling 
for distance-to-boundary trends (method M2). 
In Figure 3 we present similar pictures for a range of neighbourhood-related characteristics, 
with left and right sides split by low and high non-autonomous school value-added. These plots 
show whether cross-boundary neighbourhood differences are correlated with cross-boundary non-
autonomous school value-added differences. Evidently there are no large discontinuities in any of 
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the salient demographic or socioeconomic characteristics we consider. In addition, there are no 
significant cross-boundary differences in the average distance to schools or the number of schools 
accessible from a postcode, allaying concern about travel costs or the degree of choice differing on 
opposite side of LA borders. 
4.3. Baseline results: comparing the price effects of school value-added and prior achievements 
Table 3 presents coefficients and standard errors for our main regression results. We report only the 
key figures for school-mean value-added (‘output’) and ks1 test scores (‘composition’). The 
reported coefficients are multiplied by 100 to show, to an approximation, the percentage effect of a 
one point change in school mean test scores. Control variables are listed in the table notes. The 
specifications become increasingly stringent as we move left to right across the table. Column (1) 
reports results from a simple OLS regression using the full time-pooled cross-sectional samples for 
2002-2006; Column (2) shows the same specification estimated on the boundary sub-sample and 
Column (3) presents the cross-boundary (method M1) pair-wise differenced model described in 
Section 2.3 and in Equation (3). Columns (4) to (7) introduce the other modifications described in 
Section 2.3, by adding inverse distance weighting and distance-to-boundary polynomials (M2), LA 
boundary dummies (M3), by focussing on boundaries with below-median rates of crossing (M4) 
and by eliminating boundaries that coincide with geographical features (M5). 
To begin with, we discuss the price effects of value-added. Value-added is obtained as the 
difference between age-11 students’ ks2 data published just prior to the sale, and the ks1 scores 
from these same students when aged 7 four years earlier. In the OLS estimates, we observe very 
large and significant associations between school value-added and house prices with a one point 
change linked to an 11-14% change in prices (8-11% for a one standard deviation change in the 
school average value-added distribution). Evidently these estimates are not causal: as soon as we 
apply the boundary differencing strategy there is a dramatic fall in the price effect of school value-
added, down to 2% in Column (3). After applying inverse distance (IDW) weights in Column (4) 
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and adding distance-to-boundary polynomials, the coefficient on value-added rises to 3.8% and 
becomes more statistically significant (alternative distance-penalising weighting schemes gave 
similar results). Note that if we follow Black (1999) and only concentrate on the closest properties 
pairs (e.g. we apply equal weights of 1 to all transactions 250m apart and zero otherwise) we find 
similar results. 
An important result is that once we apply IDW weights, the coefficient on value-added remains 
very stable even when we add in boundary dummy variables as in Column (5). We can further 
include boundary × year dummies to eliminate all time-series variation occurring along boundaries 
and the value-added coefficient is almost unchanged (at 3.74). All in all, our specifications indicate 
that prices rise by about 3.7-3.8% for a one point increase in school value-added from the mean, or 
about 3% for a one standard deviation change in the school average value-added distribution. 
Our results also show a positive relationship between age-7 test (ks1) scores and house prices. 
These ks1scores are those used to construct student value-added, i.e. they are tests taken four years 
earlier. The OLS results on the full sample show a 3.7% change in prices for a one point change in 
ks1 test scores. Once we focus our attention to the boundary sample and apply IDW weights, the 
effect is reduced, but remains significant and suggests a price response of around 2.8% for a one 
point improvement or about 3% for a one standard deviation change. The interpretation we place on 
this coefficient is that it measures the house price response due to parental demand for peer quality, 
irrespective of its impact on test score progression. Comparing the response to value-added and age-
7 scores, it is evident that school choice is driven by the demand both for expected academic gain 
and for aspects of peer group quality that are uncorrelated with current academic gains (i.e. school 
intake composition conditional on school value-added). The net result is that house prices respond 
to mean age-11 (ks2) test scores, whether or not these arise through school composition or school 
value-added.  
An alternative interpretation is that ks1 achievements measure pre-age 7 school value-added, 
although a number of factors count against this interpretation. Firstly, cross-boundary differences in 
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pupil background characteristics – i.e. free-meal entitlement, ethnicity and special educational needs 
– account for 40% of the variance in cross-boundary differences in ks1 achievements. On the other 
hand, cross-boundary differences in value-added and cross-boundary differences in ks1 only share 
2.9% of their variance (i.e. the square of the correlation between va and ks1 is 0.029). Therefore, 
pupil background is the main observable component in the variation of the ks1 test scores included 
in the regressions reported in Table 3. Secondly, as we will show in Section 4.6, the effect of ks1 is 
eliminated when we include school intake characteristics in our specification. In short, age-7 test 
scores are most likely proxying for the background of the school intake, and not for pre-age 7 
teaching quality and school effectiveness in general. We will return to this point in Section 4.6 and 
in our subsequent Discussion. 
Our results change only slightly when we test their sensitivity to the fuzziness in the 
discontinuity by restricting our analysis to boundaries with a sharp discontinuity due to low rates of 
crossing (below median, or less than 5% of pupils crossing along the whole boundary) as in Column 
(6). Similarly, eliminating cases where the boundaries might split communities because they 
coincide with major roads, motorways or railways makes very little difference (Column (7)). The 
results are also robust to other specifications (not reported in the table) which include: interactions 
between distance-to-boundary and boundary dummies; two year averages of test scores to reduce 
downward biases from idiosyncratic noise in the single year variables (Kane et al., 2003 and 
Gibbons and Machin, 2003); and splitting of the sample into groups with high and low ks2 
dispersion (across schools) to check whether uncertainty over where a child will go to school 
matters. 
4.4. Falsification tests using schools that do not admit pupils based on home location 
Method M6 discussed above proposed a novel falsification test based on testing whether house 
prices respond to the quality of schools that do not ration places according to home address. Some 
initial visual evidence is provided in Figure 4, which is analogous to Figure 2, but depicts the cross-
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boundary discontinuity for autonomous school quality, where the right hand side corresponds to 
places with relatively high autonomous school quality (and vice versa for the left hand side). By 
construction there is a strong rise in school quality across the boundary (left hand panel). However, 
there is no discontinuity in house prices at the boundary (right hand panel) suggesting that there is 
no price effect from the quality of schools that do not prioritise admissions to pupils living close by. 
Table 4 presents some corresponding regression results where we compare the effect of school 
quality on house prices for autonomous and non-autonomous schools. The first two rows present 
the association of house prices with quality in non-autonomous schools that admit pupils according 
to home address. The second two rows show the coefficients for autonomous schools for which 
home-to-school distance and LA of residence are not important admission criteria. In the OLS 
estimates presented in Columns (1), we find that the association between school quality and housing 
prices is large and significant for both types of school. Given that the only reason to buy a property 
close to an autonomous school is to minimise transport costs – not to grant admission – these 
associations between autonomous school quality and house prices most likely reflects a reverse-
causal relationship between local family incomes (driven by differences in neighbourhood 
amenities, such as access to better transport) and average academic achievement in schools that 
pupils from these families attend. In contrast, as soon as we difference across LA boundaries as in 
Column (2), we still find positive and significant results for non-autonomous schools, but very 
small and insignificant effects for autonomous schools. A joint test for the coefficients on value-
added and age-7 test scores in Column (2) being equal for autonomous and non-autonomous 
schools clearly rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.025.  
A further concern is that shrewd parents seeking admission to popular autonomous schools 
might buy cheaper housing on the sides of the LA boundaries with low non-autonomous school 
quality and then send their children across the boundary to an autonomous school. This could 
attenuate our estimates of the effect of non-autonomous school, with autonomous school quality 
lifting housing prices when non-autonomous quality is low. However, as shown in Column (3), the 
 - 24 - 
interactions between autonomous and non-autonomous school quality are not significantly linked to 
prices either, making this hypothesis highly unlikely. 
4.5. Falsification tests using fake and inoperative boundaries 
In Table 5, we implement the falsification tests presented as method M7 and based on ‘imaginary’ 
boundaries. In the first two columns we pair sales in our boundary sub-sample with sales within the 
same LA. A similar test was carried out in Black (1999). Column (1) presents the simple OLS 
estimates, while Column (2) presents the coefficients based on the differenced data. OLS estimates 
are similar to what we found before on the boundary sub-sample. However, when we difference 
between close-neighbour pairs within the same LA, we find no house price effects. This suggests 
that our main findings are not spuriously driven by local unobservables, but causally linked to 
cross-boundary school quality discontinuities. Pairing transactions across fake boundaries translated 
in a south-westerly direction as in Columns (3) and (4) yields similar results. In summary, these two 
tests do not falsify our claim that the findings in Table 3 are causal estimates arising from the 
demand for school quality when admission is constrained by real attendance boundaries. 
4.6. Robustness of the results to sorting, neighbourhood attributes and other school inputs 
Sorting of heterogeneous households across boundaries could lead to biases – especially a spurious 
association between house prices and ks1 scores – if prices respond to differences in neighbourhood 
quality rather than school quality, and sorting leads to differences in school composition. To 
account for these possible issues, we introduce a variety of (potentially endogenous) neighbourhood 
demographic and school-level control variables in our regressions in Table 6. 
Column (1) repeats our preferred specification from Table 3. Column (2) adds in ks1 scores of 
age-7 pupils in the school just before (at time t-1) the time of the house purchase (at time t), 
alongside the ks1 scores of the pupils on whom our value-added measure (at t-1) was based. We 
find that this control for recent ks1 achievements is insignificant and makes no difference to our 
main coefficients. This result suggests that: (i) parents pay attention to the characteristics of pupils 
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who have just completed primary school and for whom ks2 test results are available, rather than to 
the background of younger pupils in the school; and (ii) the estimated effect of ks1 scores is causal, 
and does not arise as a result of reverse causation running from house price to recent school intake 
differentials. The next two columns add in a set of Census demographic control variables described 
in the table notes (Column (3)), or the average school achievements of children in the 
neighbourhood (this is defined as a geographical area that shares the same three nearest schools; 
Column (4)). In either case, there is little change in the coefficients on school quality, particularly 
school value-added, which confirms that school effectiveness is capitalised into house prices over 
and above the characteristics and educational progress of pupils living in the same neighbourhood. 
Overall, these findings suggest that residential sorting has little bearing on our estimates of the price 
effects of school performance – especially the contribution of value-added. 
School financial resources also have a potential relationship with housing prices – through 
taxes and through family background linkages – and this is an issue that we have not discussed yet. 
In England, resources are allocated to LAs from central government grant on the basis of needs 
(mainly numbers of pupils, levels of income, disadvantage and special educational needs). 
However, LAs tend to distribute this grant to their schools simply on the basis of pupil numbers, 
with various other small payments and allowances for severe special educational needs (Sibieta et 
al., 2008). Most of the variation in school expenditure per pupil is therefore between-LAs and hence 
taken out by our LA-pair boundary dummies (method M3). It is however possible that localised 
factors within LAs (e.g. parents’ fund raising associations) generate correlation between within-LA 
expenditure per pupil and within-LA house prices. Therefore, we add to our specifications controls 
for school resources (pupil teacher ratio, expenditure per pupil and pupil numbers) along with a 
control for local housing tax rates (Column (5)). These variables show no statistically significant 
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association with prices, and the main results on school quality remain unchanged.
11
 Next, in 
Column (6), we include school demographic characteristics that affect school income, namely 
percentages of pupils eligible for free meals, from ethnic minorities and with special educational 
needs. In this specification, the coefficient on ks1 test scores falls to near zero and is statistically 
insignificant. This is mainly because the school proportion of low-income pupils eligible for free 
meals does a better job at measuring those dimensions of school composition that influence parental 
demand and house prices. Other aspects of school composition – ethnicity and special educational 
needs – turn out to be irrelevant. In contrast, although the coefficient on value-added is attenuated 
slightly in this saturated model, it remains highly statistically significant and important in size, 
emphasising the crucial role of value-added in driving the house price response. 
4.7. Interpretation and discussion 
Our results show that households pay significant house price premium to gain access to schools that 
are likely to raise their children’s educational achievements – i.e. high value-added schools. The 
results also suggest that households pay an additional premium for a favourable distribution of pupil 
characteristics – which we represented by higher mean achievements at age 7. This premium seems 
to be linked to the willingness of households to pay for a more favourable family income 
distribution in the school – namely, fewer children on free school meals – rather than school 
effectiveness at the earliest stages of education. Other factors such as ethnic mix, higher school 
expenditures or smaller classes do not influence demand (conditional on value-added). 
As it turns out, the magnitudes of the effects of school composition and value-added are 
similar, which implies that a one point increase in school average test scores at age 11 is valued 
approximately the same, irrespective of whether this is achieved through value-added or school 
composition. One potential explanation is that parents use the headline, end-of-primary test scores 
                                                 
11
 This is not surprising given the weak link between resources and performance that can be observed within cross-
sectional data on state school systems (see among others Hanushek, 2003, and Levacic and Vignoles, 2002). 
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as an indicator of academic effectiveness, but do not differentiate between test scores generated by 
school effectiveness and those due to a school enrolling high achieving pupils from the start. An 
implication of this conjecture is that households are paying in part for aspects of schools that are 
unlikely to make much difference to their own child's achievement. Another possibility is that 
value-added is really just another dimension of school composition, reflecting the average rate of 
progress of pupils enrolling in a school, but unrelated to the expected gains the school would 
generate for a child picked at random. The implication then is that parents pay to access schools that 
admit fast-progressing pupils, even though these schools offer no obvious academic benefits to their 
own child. Both these scenarios seem theoretically and empirically unappealing (see Section 4.6). 
The most plausible explanation that is consistent with our results is that parents value both 
academic effectiveness and composition aspects of school quality because they are interested in 
their own child’s academic progress, as well as the social status of their child’s peers. 
5. Conclusion 
A principal objective of this paper was to establish whether the well-documented response of 
housing prices to school-mean test scores represents a demand for the educational value-added 
output of schools, or demand for components of school quality that are desirable, but unlikely to 
raise a child’s achievements. Therefore, our first research aim was to go further than previous work 
in finding out if, why, and by how much people pay for homes near good schools. This is a crucial 
policy question, because if prices respond to educational output, this signals a value in public 
investments in teaching quality, leadership and resources, that potentially lead to higher 
achievements, better lifetime outcomes and economic performance. 
In order to tackle this issue, we developed a number of refinements to the boundary 
discontinuity approach and applied a series of novel robustness checks and falsification tests in 
order to establish causality. These methods are of broader interest in that they potentially generalise 
to other contexts such as border effects in international trade (Redding and Sturm, 2008; Hanson, 
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2004), provision of health care (Cooper et al., 2011), and the effects of local tax regimes and 
policies on housing costs and business location (Cushing, 1984; Holmes, 1998). 
Our headline finding is that house prices respond equally to both the expected academic gains 
during primary school and the initial characteristics of students. Most importantly, the statistical 
association between school value-added and house prices appears to be causal: our estimates are 
empirically indestructible, regardless of our many attempts to falsify this claim by testing for 
alternative causal channels. This finding persuades us that parents really do care about value-added 
when they value schools. 
The magnitude of our estimates of the effect of school quality is in line with previous research 
for England and internationally (see Gibbons and Machin, 2008, Black and Machin 2010): prices 
increase from the mean by about 3% for a one standard deviation improvement in school-mean age-
7 to age-11 value-added, plus about 3% for a one standard deviation increase in mean school 
achievements at age 7. It is interesting to note that these figures are plausible when benchmarked 
against alternative options and the future labour market returns. A standard deviation in the pupil 
test score distribution is worth around 11% or £20,500 on house prices, equivalent to just over 2.5 
years of private schooling fees at the time of this study. Further, the present value of the labour 
market returns of this educational improvement – at approximately £20,600 – are of a similar order 
of magnitude to its capitalised housing value.
12
 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix B for details of these calculations. 
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6. Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Full data set Boundary sub-sample 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Price 182730 153372 195910 165360 
Log price 11.91 0.642 11.98 0.625 
Age 11-7 value-added 12.60 0.789 12.69 0.781 
Age 7 English and Maths points 14.90 1.093 14.62 1.087 
Age 11 English and Maths points 27.50 1.235 27.31 1.189 
Number of schools in catchment area 3.98 2.19 3.871 1.937 
Distance from home to school 2289.4 1376 1779.5 1083.8 
Distance to boundary - - 492.6 347.4 
Inverse distance weighted distance to boundary - - 133.2 202.9 
Distance between properties - - 723.1 402.2 
Inverse distance weighted property distance - - 205.5 133.2 
Observations 1656056 138132 
 
 
 
Table 2: Statistics for pupils crossing admission district boundaries 
 Full data set Boundary sub-sample 
Mean postcode proportion non-autonomous boundary crossers 0.033 0.062 
IDW mean postcode proportion non-autonomous crossers - 0.250 
Median postcode proportion non-autonomous boundary crossers - 0 
Notes: Figures refer to proportions in the postcode. IDW means weighted by inverse distance between matched property 
transactions pairs (i.e. weighted toward observations that have zero-distance matches on opposite side to admission 
district boundary). 
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Table 3: OLS and cross-boundary difference models of the effect of school quality measures on house prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
 
Method: 
OLS all 
England 
OLS 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M1 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M2 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M3 
Low cross. 
sample 
M4 
Eliminate geo-
features  
M5 
Age 11-7 Value-added 
(year t-1 – t-5) 
**10.64 
(0.55) 
**14.23 
(1.03) 
**2.06 
(0.52) 
**3.81 
(0.90) 
**3.69 
(0.87) 
**3.49 
(1.09) 
**3.62 
(0.95) 
Age7 English, maths 
(year t-5) 
**3.66 
(0.45) 
0.53 
(1.05) 
**3.57 
(0.52) 
**2.87 
(0.85) 
**2.75 
(0.80) 
**3.07 
(0.91) 
*2.27 
(0.91) 
Inverse distance weights & 
boundary distance cubics 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Admissions authority 
boundary fixed effects 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1656001 138132 138132 138132 138132 60394 118779 
Notes: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to give the % effect of a one point change in 
explanatory variables. Dependent variable: log house sales price. School characteristics imputed from schools accessible from housing 
transaction site. Control variables are: average rooms per dwelling in transaction’s census 2001 output area, census output area 
proportion of households social renting, census ward population density, ward proportion under continuous or semi-continuous urban 
land cover, number of schools accessible from transaction site, average distance to accessible schools, distance from transaction site to 
local authority boundary, year dummies. Sample based on transaction pairs for second-hand home sales in years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
first quarter of 2006, from Land Registry “Price-paid” postcode dataset. Columns (1) and (2) include additional controls for property 
type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (3) to 
(7) are differenced between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school admissions authority boundary, where 
neighbouring pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and ownership type. Column (6) sample restricted to boundaries 
with below-median proportions (<5%) of pupils crossing. Column (7) eliminates cases where boundaries coincide with major roads, 
motorways and railways. Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest sites across boundaries (15489 clusters, Columns (3) to (7)), 
or clustered on Census ward (Columns (1) and (2)). Test for equality of coefficients on age 7 tests and value-added in weighted x-LA 
models Column (4) to (7) fails to reject null (e.g.: Column (6), p-value = 0.359). 
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Table 4: Falsification checks with autonomous schools (Method M8) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS on boundary 
sample 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M6 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M6 
Age 11-7 Value-added (year t-1 – t-5), non-autonomous 
schools 
**14.46 
(1.03) 
**3.68 
(0.87) 
**3.70 
(0.87) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-5), non-autonomous schools -1.23 
(1.16) 
**2.72 
(0.80) 
**2.72 
(0.80) 
Age 11-7 Value-added (year t-1 – t-5), in autonomous 
schools 
**9.89 
(1.05) 
0.72 
(0.80) 
0.74 
(0.89) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-5), autonomous schools **5.76 
(0.97 
0.70 
(0.80) 
0.66 
(0.80) 
Age 11-7 value-added autonomous x autonomous - - 1.93 
(1.15) 
Age 7 English maths, autonomous x autonomous - - -0.63 
(0.83) 
Inverse distance weights and distance to boundary cubic No Yes Yes 
Admissions boundary dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 138132 138132 138132 
Notes: As for Table 3 and 4. Column (1) includes additional controls for property type (detached, semi-detached, 
terraced, flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (2) to (3) are 
differences between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school admissions authority boundary, where 
neighbouring pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and ownership type. Standard errors are clustered 
on matched nearest sites across boundaries (15489 clusters, Columns (2) to (3)), or clustered on Census ward 
(Columns (1)). 
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Table 5: Falsification tests: Within-admissions zone and fake boundary difference models of the effect of 
school quality on house prices (Method M7) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS within-LA    
boundary 
sample 
Within-LA 
boundary 
sample 
OLS fake 
boundary 
sample 
Cross fake 
LA boundary 
Age 11-7 Value-added 
(year t-1 – t-5) 
**14.96 
(0.94) 
0.55 
(0.54) 
**16.85 
(1.50) 
0.57 
(1.56) 
Age7 English, maths 
(year t-5) 
**3.28 
(0.83) 
0.79 
(0.48) 
-0.328 
(1.83) 
0.15 
(1.23) 
IDW & boundary distance cubic No Yes No Yes 
Admissions boundary dummies - - No Yes 
Observations 130500 130500 92054 92054 
Notes: As for Table 3. Column (1) includes additional controls for property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, 
flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (2) and are differences 
between neighbouring transaction pairs on same side of school admissions authority boundaries, where neighbouring 
pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and ownership type, and a minimum distance of 20m and 
maximum distance of 1500m is imposed. Variables in Column (4) are differences between neighbouring transaction 
pairs on opposite sides of ‘fake’ school admissions authority boundaries, where neighbouring pairs are matched by 
transaction year, property type and ownership type. Fake boundaries are created by translation 10km North and East. 
Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest sites (Columns (2) and (4)), or clustered on Census ward (Columns 
(1) and (3)). 
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Table 6: Some models with additional (potentially endogenous) controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cross-LA 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
Age 11-7 Value-added 
(year t-1 – t-5) 
**3.69 
(0.87) 
**3.52 
(0.89) 
**3.11 
(0.88) 
**3.86 
(1.01) 
**3.18 
(0.85) 
**2.37 
(0.87) 
Age7 English, maths 
(year t-5) 
**2.75 
(0.80) 
*2.25 
(0.93) 
*1.82 
(0.79) 
**2.47 
(0.80) 
**2.38 
(0.76) 
0.37 
(0.85) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-1) No 0.94 
(0.79) 
No No No No 
Neighbourhood control variables No No p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
House neighbourhood Age 7-11 
value-added and age 7 scores 
No No No p=0.006 No No 
School expenditure  No No No No p=0.385 No 
Local housing (council) tax rate No No No No Yes No 
Pupil characteristics No No No No No p=0.069 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IDW & boundary distance cubic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Admissions authority boundary 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 138132 130972 138120 104929 137118 137643 
Notes: As for Table 3. All variables are differences between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school 
admissions authority boundary, where neighbouring pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and 
ownership type. Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest sites across boundaries. Neighbourhood control 
variables include proportions high qualified, unqualified, black, labour market active, unemployed, with dependant 
children, retired and of homes sold. School expenditure and local taxes control set includes expenditure per pupil, 
pupil-teacher ratio, number of full-time equivalent pupils and local housing taxes. Pupil characteristics include 
percentage of pupil eligible for free school meals, percentage of pupils from ethnic minority and percentage of pupils 
with special educational needs. Neighbourhood characteristics are measured at Census Output Area level, the smallest 
geographical unit in the GB 2001 Census containing on average 130 households. 
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Figure 1: Example extracts from the boundary sample 
Panel A: Map of the  Midlands, Manchester and Yorkshire 
 
Panel B: Map of the London and the South-East 
 
Note: The data used in the empirical analysis covers boundaries over all of England. 
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Figure 2: Discontinuities in non-autonomous school quality and house prices 
Non-autonomous value-added, by non-autonomous value-
added, p=0.000 
Log house price, by non-autonomous value-added, 
p=0.006 
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Notes: The scale on the x-axis is in metres from the boundary, at the minimum of each bin used in the regressions. The 
scale on the y-axis is in standard deviations. 
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Figure 3: Discontinuities and non-discontinuities in neighbourhood characteristics 
Dwelling size. p=0.429 Population density: p=0.147 
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Proportion black, p=0.152 Share of dwellings sold, p=0.076 
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
Boundary Distance
 
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
Boundary Distance
 
Proportion social tenants, p=0.100 Proportion unemployed, p=0.598 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
Proportion labour market active, p=0.266 Proportion high qualified, p=0.118 
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Average distance to schools in catchment area, p=0.902 Number of schools in catchment area, p=0.572 
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Notes: The scale on the x-axis is in metres from the boundary, at the minimum of each bin used in the regressions. The 
scale on the y-axis is in standard deviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Discontinuities and non-discontinuities in autonomous school quality and house prices 
Autonomous value-added, by autonomous value-added, 
p=0.000 
Log house price, by autonomous value-added,    
p=0.452 
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Notes: The scale on the x-axis is in metres from the boundary, at the minimum of each bin used in the regressions. The 
scale on the y-axis is in standard deviations. 
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Appendix A: Procedure for defining school catchment areas 
In our ‘revealed preference’ procedure, we start by estimating the approximate shape of the 
catchment area for each school using the residential postcode of pupils in the year when they start 
at the school. This shape is delineated by the 75
th
 percentile of the home-to-school distance in each 
of 10 sectors radiating from each school location (starting West and moving anticlockwise). Each 
of the 10 sectors is drawn to capture 10% of the school intake. This procedure relaxes constraints 
on the shape of catchment areas, allowing for geographically asymmetric patterns of attendance 
with sufficient flexibility to apply our boundary discontinuity design. The reason we truncate the 
catchment areas at the 75
th
 percentile home-school distance in each direction is to remove outliers 
that could artificially inflate the size of the imputed school catchment areas. Discarding these 
outliers reduces the likelihood of erroneously drawing catchment areas across LA boundaries, and 
ensures that we focus on areas in which there is a high chance of admission. Note that we 
experimented with other distance thresholds, as well as with overlapping fixed interval radial 
sectors and alternative starting points and orientations, with little effect on the results. 
It is important to point out that this procedure is required to assign school quality to housing 
transactions within LAs in an institutional setting where school catchment areas are not formalised 
and enforced. However, this approach does not drive the boundary discontinuities that we exploit 
to identify the causal impact of school quality on house prices. These discontinuities are generated 
by LA admissions rules discussed in Section 3.2, which dictate that students attend a school in 
their LA of residence.  
It is worth highlighting why this fairly complex shaping procedure is necessary to our cross-
LA boundary design by considering some alternatives. Suppose we simply assigned the quality of 
the nearest school to each housing transaction, or arbitrarily drew a circular catchment area around 
each school. To implement a boundary discontinuity strategy, we would need to artificially impose 
the constraint that a student in a house on one side of an attendance district boundary – i.e. the LA 
boundary – cannot attend their nearest school if it lies on the other side. Without this restriction, 
 - 44 - 
the set of schools available close to an admissions zone boundary, but on opposite sides of it, 
would be nearly identical to each other and there would be no source of variation in school quality 
for identification in the boundary discontinuity model (violating Assumption A2). However, we 
would not want to impose this constraint if the discontinuity did not actually exist. Our imputation 
procedure does not force any such truncation of the catchment area at the boundary unless it is 
supported by the spatial distribution of pupils’ homes in relation to the schools they attend. Stated 
differently, we allow our de-facto catchment areas of schools close to the LA boundaries to be 
truncated and shrunk in the direction of the boundaries – as well as in any other areas and 
trajectories – only when the data reveal that this is the ‘right’ pattern. Therefore, any discontinuity 
that we detect in our analysis is not imposed by design but revealed by parental responses to 
institutional features and LA boundaries, and expressed by actual school choices. 
Appendix B: Benchmarking the price effects against private school fees and labour market 
returns to education 
The price response for a standard deviation in the pupil score distribution (2.7 value-added points) 
is around 11% or about £20,500 at the house prices prevalent at the time of our study (or 
approximately £1500 per year on a repayment mortgage over 25 years at 5% interest rate). This 
cost is equivalent to just over 2.5 years of private schooling fees (about £2800 per term for private 
day-schooling in England in 2006-7). These figures are also comparable to the value of the 
investment in a child’s education. To see this, consider that Machin and McNally (2008) estimate 
a labour market return of about 0.42% to a one percentile increase in age-10 test scores, for a 
cohort of children raised in the 1970s and 1980s. This implies that a one standard deviation 
improvement in achievement at this age raises future earnings by 12%. Following Machin et al. 
(2010), we calculate the present value of this 12% increase on earnings between ages 16 and 65, 
discounted back to child’s age 5, when parents are likely to buy their home for primary school 
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admission.
13
 This calculation gives a discounted lifetime benefit of approximately £20,600, which 
is very close to the house price response to one standard deviation improvement in the pupil test 
score distribution (about £20,500). This comparison is based on the fully capitalized value of the 
house, and the benefits of this investment could clearly outstrip the user costs taking into account 
potential house price appreciation. Similarly, the benefits could significantly outweigh the costs 
for families with more than one child. Nevertheless, these calculations illustrate that the house 
price response to school quality that we document is of a plausible magnitude given the expected 
return in terms of future earnings.  
                                                 
13
 Machin et al. (2010) estimate average yearly earnings for all individuals aged 16 to 64 in the Family Earnings 
Survey (2002/2003) to be around £10,700. They then propose to use a discount rate of 3.5%, in line with the 
recommendations in the UK HM Treasury Green Book (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.htm). 
Considering the 12% return to a one percentile increase in age 10 test scores discussed above, we estimate the benefits 
over ages 16 to 65, and discounted back to age 5, as follows: 
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